Subjects in the lab, activists in the field: public goods and punishment
Economics
What happens when the people in an economics experiment are not students, but real-world activists? By bringing a public-goods game into the field in Mumbai, we uncover how experience with collective action shapes people’s willingness to accept cooperation, and to punish those who refuse it, even at a personal cost.
Written with Chetan Dave, Sjur Hamre, and Alicja Reuben
Abstract: We compare standard (laboratory) and non-standard (field) subject pool behavior in an extensive form public goods game with random punishment. Our experimental investigation is motivated by real-world ‘Activists’ encouraging public goods provision by firms; an activity known as corporate social responsibility. We find that relative to laboratory subjects, activists in Mumbai are more willing to settle at the Nash equilibrium of the game (which entails increased provision of public goods) and are more willing to punish non-cooperative firm behavior even if such punishments hurt their own payoffs.